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Introduction
An extensive literature on vote/popularity functions has shown that the economy influences the vote. Additionally, research on political business cycles (hereafter, PBC) has found evidence that politicians try to manipulate the economy, particularly fiscal policy instruments, in order to woo the electorate and gain reelection. However, these two issues have mostly been addressed independently. 1 A notable exception is Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2010) that proposes a new test of the rational political business cycle and implements it on a sample of Portuguese local governments.
Their results show that opportunistic increases in expenditures lead to larger winmargins for incumbent mayors, and that incumbents are more opportunistic when their win-margin is expected to be small.
The present paper tests, on an international setting, the joint hypotheses that policymakers engage in fiscal policy opportunism and that voters respond by rewarding that opportunism with higher vote margins. The test is implemented for national governments, using a sample of 68 countries and 40 years of data. We allow for opportunism to occur, not only in governments' expenditures, but also on the revenue side. The empirical strategy also builds on the strategic debt models proposed by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabelini (1990) , where the economy exhibits a deficit bias when incumbents anticipate being replaced in the next election by a new government with different objectives.
Furthermore, we address the issue of transparency in fiscal policy by incorporating a measure of fiscal illusion in our regressions. 2 According to Buchanan (1967) , politicians engage in tactics to produce fiscal illusion so that voters overestimate the benefits of public expenditures and underestimate the tax burden.
More recently, Alt and Lassen (2006) argued that lack of transparency in fiscal policy encourages PBCs.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review, and section 3 the empirical model. The data sources and the fiscal illusion index are described in section 4, and the empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review
Research on electoral economics developed in the 1970's with the seminal works of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) , Mueller (1970) , and Kramer (1971) for vote/popularity functions, and Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) for opportunistic and partisan business cycles. Since then, many papers have been written, but these two topics have mostly been analyzed independently. An exception in this first generation of papers is Frey and Schneider (1978) . This study highlighted the importance of analyzing the interrelationship between the economy and the polity, by presenting estimations of popularity functions for the US president, along with government expenditure reaction functions that took into account a re-election motive influenced by the popularity of the incumbent.
The rational expectations revolution brought new challenges to the literature, since rational voters could not be systematically fooled one election after the other by opportunistic politicians. New models were developed where a PBC could result from asymmetries of information between policymakers and voters. In rational opportunistic models, such as Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) , incumbents signal their competence to the electorate by manipulating budgetary items. In the former, governments increase distortionary taxes before elections in order to increase expenditures, and/or decrease non-distortionary taxes that are immediately visible by the electorate. Rogoff (1990) emphasizes the composition of expenditure items: before elections, governments increase expenditures that are immediately visible by the electorate, as opposed to those that only become visible after the election. In Alesina's (1987) model, it is the uncertainty about the ideology of the party that will win the balloting that justifies the appearance of rational partisan cycles.
Regarding the empirical literature, the first generation of papers testing political business cycles made use of national-level data on elections and real macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment and inflation. With the introduction of rational expectations in the models, empirical research re-focused the analysis to economic policy instruments, particularly those of fiscal policy. Tests performed on macroeconomic outcomes generally fail to provide evidence of PBCs, 3 but more favorable evidence is found for fiscal policy outcomes. Although the number of papers testing PBC is extensive, the micro incentives for political business cycles have received insufficient attention, as pointed out by Willett and Keil (2004: 414) in their survey of PBCs.
We intend to build on the PBC literature by estimating voting functions and the determinants of opportunistic policies as a system of equations, using a sample of OECD countries over 40 years. To our knowledge, only Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2010) have presented joint estimations of voting functions and policy reaction functions, but their research deals with local governments for a specific country (Portugal). Akhmedov and Zhurasvskaya (2004) and Drazen and Eslava (2010) (Shi and Svensson, 2006) , where voters are inexperienced with electoral politics (Brender and Drazen, 2005; Brender, 2003; Akhmedov and Zhurasvskaya, 2004) , politicians are less credible (Keefer and Razvan, 2008) , and fiscal policy is less transparent (Alt and Lassen, 2006) . We address this issue in our research by analysing the influence of fiscal illusion on electoral results and on opportunistic practices. The hypothesis of fiscal illusion was first introduced by Puviani (1903) but came into the mainstream of economic research with Buchanan (1967) . In countries where fiscal illusion is stronger, voters do not take into account the government's intertemporal budget constraint. They tend to overestimate the benefits of recent policies and underestimate the resulting future fiscal burden. Therefore, fiscal illusion increases the popularity of the incumbent politician and contributes to the perpetuation of the ruling class. Edelman (2001) and Caplan (2007) also suggest that a reason for political illusion is political opportunism because politicians want to maximize the probability of success of their opportunistic practices. According to these authors, illusions strengthen the effects on voters of benefits gained from opportunistic increases in expenditures and reductions in taxation. Edelman (2001) discusses the ways in which this information asymmetry is supported by many sources of political illusion.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on strategic debt models of Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) . In these models policymakers with different preferences alternate in office and use government debt to influence the choices of their successors. According to Persson and Svensson (1989) if the probability of being reelected depends upon the policy pursued.
The empirical model
Based on the theoretical arguments presented in the previous section, we expect incumbents to behave more opportunistically when they are more uncertain of winning the election, and we expect opportunistic policies to improve governments' electoral prospects. The empirical model thus tests for the reciprocal influence of opportunistic fiscal policies and the win-margin of incumbents, taking into account the degree of fiscal illusion existent in the country, and other factors that may influence the political business cycle. Our system of two simultaneous equations can be described as follows: In the first equation (Eq. 1), the dependent variable is the margin of victory obtained by the main incumbent party in legislative elections (MV it ). We measure the win-margin by the difference between the log of the vote share of the most voted party and the log of the vote share or the largest opposition party. In the second equation (Eq. 2), the dependent variable is a measure of the opportunistic electoral distortion in the fiscal aggregate (OD it ). This is proxied by the difference in logs of the share of public expenditures/revenues of GDP in the electoral year and the share over the entire term of office.
We expect the opportunistic distortion to have a positive impact (
the margin of victory of the incumbent when it is implemented through public expenditures, but to have a negative effect when revenues are manipulated.
According to the literature on electoral opportunism and the use of debt as a strategic variable, the lower is the expected win-margin, the larger is the incumbents' incentive to generate a positive (negative) distortion in public expenditures (revenues). That is, we expect a negative sign (α 1 < 0) for the estimated coefficient associated with the margin of victory when estimating equation 1 for expenditures, and a positive sign when estimating equation 1 for revenues (α 1 > 0).
Regarding the influence of fiscal illusion on the margin of victory, we expect a positive sign for the estimated β m+1 coefficient. According to Puviani (1903) fiscal illusion leads to the perpetuation of incumbents in power, and therefore, to higher expected win-margins. Additionally, the manipulation of fiscal variables to win 8 elections and condition the fiscal stances of the next government is expected to be larger in environments where fiscal illusion is stronger (Mourão, 2007) . That is, a positive sign is expected for the estimated coefficient associated with α n+1 in the case of public expenditures, and a negative one for public revenues.
Matrix X in equation 1 comprises variables that may influence the electoral prospects, and that are present in most studies of vote functions for panels of countries. 4 In order to test if governments are held responsible for the evolution of the economy, the unemployment rate (unemployment it ) and the inflation rate (inflation it )
were included as explanatory variables. The win-margin from the previous election captures persistency in voting behavior. To measure the costs of ruling, we include the consecutive number of years the party has been in office (years in incumbency it ), and a dummy for parties in office for two or more consecutive terms (re-election it ).
The degree of government fractionalization (government fractionalization it ) measures the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. Finally, a dummy for OECD countries (OECD it ) should capture differences in institutions that are likely to influence electoral results.
All variables were measured in logarithms, except for the index of government fractionalization and the number of years in office.
In equation 2, column Y includes other variables that may help us understand cross-country differences as well as inter-temporal changes in the dimension of political opportunism. Following Wildavsky (1964) , who suggested that, to succeed in signaling competence, governments need higher deviations in budget aggregates as budget aggregates increase, we expect the log of term average values for public expenditures (or for public revenues) as shares of GDP (public exp/rev share it ) to positively influence fiscal opportunism. Parties which stay office longer in (years in incumbency it ) and run for re-election (re-election it ) are expected to generate a larger 9 distortion (Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2010) . A dummy for the right-wing party in incumbency (right-wing it ) is also included to test if ideology matters. Although most studies do not take government's partisan orientation into account when investigating the degree of political opportunism, Veiga and Veiga (2007) found that right-wing Portuguese mayors to be less opportunistic than left-wing parties; and, Brug et al. (2007) argued that left-wing governments tend to reduce unemployment through more opportunist policies than right-wing governments, which are more concerned with inflation. The log of the proportion of people over age 65 was included to test for the findings of Simon (1985) and Binstock (2006) , who demonstrated that older electors are more reactive to opportunist practices. A dummy for OECD countries and the log of real GDP per capita were also considered as proxies for the level of development of the country and maturity of institutions. Previous studies, namely Shi and Svensson (2006) , have found opportunism to be stronger in developing countries.
Data sources and the fiscal illusion index
Our panel (2008), which provides a full description of the variables included in the index, and the methodology used in its construction.
6 Table 1 specifies the sources of data for each variable used in the paper and presents the descriptive statistics.
<Table 1>
Empirical results
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show estimation results for the system of equations described above using alternative specifications and econometric methods. Tests were implemented for fiscal opportunism on expenditures (table 2) and revenues (table 3 ).
Then, we tested the hypothesis of identical coefficients for OECD and non-OECD countries (table 4) . In all tables, standard errors are shown in parentheses, and the adjusted R-squared and the numbers of observations are reported at the bottom of the tables. The first two columns of tables 2 and 3, and all columns of Analyzing the determinants of the win-margin in detail (first part of column 1 in tables 2) we conclude that governing parties are held responsible for economic conditions in the country, as increases in unemployment and inflation reduce their electoral prospectus. In terms of magnitude, it is worth noting that inflation exerts a bigger influence than unemployment, as the estimated coefficient associated with it is significantly higher. 8 There is evidence that parties who won by a larger margin in the previous election obtain better electoral results in the next balloting. This result confirms the persistence of votes over time, which can be due to ideology, among other factors. Results also suggest the existence of costs of ruling since the number of years in incumbency reduces the electoral prospects, and parties that win elections for two or more consecutive terms of office obtain fewer votes.
Furthermore, more fractionalized governments seem to have lower winning-margins, and the same occurs in OECD countries relative to all 68 countries included in the sample.
Regarding the second part of table 2, which examines the determinants of As an additional robustness test, we used an alternative measure for the winmargin consisting on the (log) ratio between the vote share of the most voted party and the sum of votes shares of all the other parties. Empirical results obtained for this alternative variable 9 do not differ significantly from those reported here.
We then proceeded by performing the estimations of the system of equations using public revenues instead of public expenditures as the fiscal policy variable ( revenues in GDP has a positive effect on the electoral distortion in revenues, that is, the larger they are the less public revenues in balloting years are below their term average. This is probably due to a scale effect. Results for expenditures (Table 2) suggest that when the public sector is bigger, deviations of public expenditures from term averages in electoral moments also tend to be large. Since a large share of public expenditures on GDP is usually associated with a higher weight of public revenues, it is comprehensible that if expenditures are increased in electoral years revenues cannot be manipulated as much, otherwise this behavior would generate a very large deficit. Another interesting result is the positive sign of the estimated coefficient associated with years in incumbency, as in Table 2 for expenditures.
Thus, there is evidence that less experienced politicians tend to use revenues as their strategic variable, while those with more experience favor expenditures. Results for the remaining variables are basically the same as for expenditures, in terms of significance and expected sign of the estimated coefficient, except for the real GDP per capita that now turns out to be statistically significant. In countries where real GDP per capita is higher the manipulation of public revenues for strategic electoral purposes seems to be smaller. This result corroborates the one obtained for the dummy identifying OECD countries.
As for fiscal illusion, it continues to contribute to the perpetuation of politicians in office (the estimated coefficient associated with the index is positive and statistically significant in equation 1), and to induce the strategic use of fiscal policy instruments (in this case, revenues) as a tool to win elections and restrain the budgetary options of the next government. The results obtained for estimations using 3SLS and FIML are similar to those generated by GMM.
Given that the dummy for OECD countries is statistically significant in all specifications of Tables 2 and 3 , we run separate regressions for OECD and non-OECD countries. This procedure is line with Brender and Drazen (2007) , and Alt and Lassen (2006) , who suggested splitting the samples according to the level of development of the countries and the maturity of democracy. As can be seen from Fiscal illusion promotes higher win-margins in both cases, but the impact is larger in non OECD countries where the institutions are less mature. 11 There is also evidence that our measures for opportunist distortions are more influenced by fiscal illusion in non-OECD countries. 12 Regarding the economic variables, it is also worth noticing that unemployment exerts a bigger influence on the win-margin in elections occurring in non-OECD countries, while voters from OECD countries are more sensitive to inflation. Re-elected parties win by smaller margins in non-OECD countries and government fractionalization seems to exert a bigger influence on electoral results in OECD countries. 13 It is also worth noticing that when we split the sample, the dummy for right-wing governments now turns out to be statistically significant in the four regressions of table 4, suggesting that right-wing parties are less inclined to manipulate fiscal policy instruments with political purposes. This result is in accordance with Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2010) and Veiga and Veiga (2007) , who found that in Portugal, right-wing mayors behave less opportunistically than left-wing ones. For the other variables, empirical results remain essentially the same as those presented in Tables 2 and 3. 14
Conclusion
The innovation of this paper is to address the determinants of fiscal policy choices in electoral years, in particular whether fear to be removed from office induces increases in expenditures and reductions in public revenues. In order to do so, we estimate a system of equations where vote expectations explain changes in fiscal policy variables in electoral years, and where these changes influence electoral results. The analysis also takes into account the economic, political and institutional situation of the country. This research is implemented using a large sample covering 68 countries and legislative election years from 1960 to 2006.
Empirical results reveal that expectations of getting voted out of office lead governments to increase expenditures and reduce revenues in electoral years, in accordance with opportunistic budgetary models (Rogoff and Sibert 1988) and strategic debt models (Persson and Svensson 1998; Alesina and Tabellini 1990) .
Furthermore, there is evidence that strategic manipulation of fiscal variables generates votes for the incumbent.
Additionally, we find that higher levels of fiscal illusion promote the strategic use of budgetary items for political purposes and larger win-margins for the most voted party, contributing to the perpetuation of politicians in power (Puviani 1903; Buchanan 1967) . By generating a wrong perception of government budget aggregates from the voters' and taxpayers' perspectives, fiscal illusion erodes the quality of democracy in at least two ways. On one hand, by creating a favorable environment for political opportunism, it increases rent-seeking behavior, political corruption, and distrust between voters and elected agents. On the other hand, by perpetuating politicians in power, it reduces political competition, and prevents the renewal of the ruling class. In OECD countries win-margins are lower and the degree of fiscal manipulation is also less pronounced. For public revenues, increases in real GDP are also associated with less political manipulation of the budgetary item.
There is also evidence that voters hold politicians accountable for the economic situation of the country, and that OECD voters are more sensitive to inflation while non-OECD voters react more to unemployment. Time spent in office lowers the margin of victory in the next election, and more fractionalized governments achieve worse electoral results. Larger public sectors and years in incumbency promote the strategic use of expenditures for political purposes, but reduce this behavior in revenues. Re-elected politicians are more opportunistic, and there is also some evidence of right-wing governments being less opportunistic.
Appendix -The Fiscal Illusion Index
Data for the fiscal illusion Index was obtained from Mourão (2008) , who empirically evaluated the extension of fiscal illusion in 68 democracies since 1960. The index was constructed taking into consideration multiple dimensions that may influence fiscal illusion, including the perspectives of those who exert public power and of those who are ruled.
After identifying the theoretical framework, twenty-six variables were chosen and included in the index computation. Table A 1 See Drazen (2000) and Mueller (2003) for surveys on economic performance and political success.
2 Puviani (1903) pioneered the literature on political illusion, understood as practices adopted by politicians to deceive voters and perpetuate the power of the ruling class. According to Puviani, fiscal illusion is the most important form of political illusion.
3 Hibbs (1977) , McCallum (1978) , Paldam (1979) , Beck (1982) and Franzese (2002) . Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela.
6 Refer to the appendix for a brief explanation.
7 Table 1 shows that the mean of the Win-margin is equal to -0,116. The anti-log of -0.116 equals 0.89 percentage points.
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9 Available from the authors upon request.
10 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 10% significance level.
11 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 5% significance level.
12 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 5% significance level. Number of observations 150 100 150 100 Notes: Significance level: 1% (a); 5% (b); 10% (c). Standard errors between parentheses. System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy variables for country and time specific effects.
